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Background and objectives: Rumination is a major contributor to the maintenance of affective disorders
and has been linked to memory control deﬁcits. However, ruminators often report intentionally engaging
in repetitive thought due to its perceived beneﬁts. Deliberate re-processing may lead to the appearance
of a memory control deﬁcit that is better explained as a difference in cognitive style.
Methods: Ninety-six undergraduate students volunteered to take part in a direct-suppression variant of
the Think/No-Think paradigm after which they completed self-report measures of rumination and the
degree to which they deliberately re-processed the to-be-suppressed items.
Results: We demonstrate a relation between rumination and impaired suppression-induced forgetting.
This relation is robust even when controlling for deliberate re-processing of the to-be-suppressed items,
a behavior itself related to both rumination and suppression. Therefore, whereas conscious ﬁxation on
to-be-suppressed items reduced memory suppression, it did not fully account for the relation between
rumination and memory suppression.
Limitations: The current experiment employed a retrospective measure of deliberate re-processing in the
context of an unscreened university sample; future research might therefore generalize our ﬁndings
using an online measure of deliberate re-processing or within a clinical population.
Conclusions: We provide evidence that deliberate re-processing accounts for some e but not all e of the
relation between rumination and suppression-induced forgetting. The present ﬁndings, observed in a
paradigm known to engage top-down inhibitory modulation of mnemonic processing, provide the most
theoretically focused evidence to date for the existence of a memory control deﬁcit in rumination.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1 It is worth noting that whereas rumination is generally viewed negatively, this
is not universally true: Rumination is sometimes viewed as an adaptive process
aimed at ameliorating an aversive environmental or emotional challenge. For
example, Andrews and Thompson (2009) have argued that brain regions afﬁliated
with sustained attention (e.g., the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex) become more
active during depression. Viewed from this light, rumination could reﬂect an1. Introduction
Cognitive control plays an important role in maintaining good
mental health. For example, it allows us to direct attention away
from thoughts that might otherwise upset us, and focus instead on
more productive activities. However, when such control fails, we
may instead ﬁnd ourselves doing the opposite: Dwelling on nega-
tive thoughts, sometimes with dire consequences (although, seeiences Unit, 15 Chaucer Road,
.uk (J.M. Fawcett).
r Ltd. This is an open access articleAndrews& Thompson, 2009).1 The tendency to perseverate on past
negative experiences has been termed ‘depressive rumination’emergent property of a neurobiological mechanism that encourages a ﬁxation on
current problems and could e perhaps with the help of psychotherapy e lead to
resolution. Because the current experiments deal with the control of rumination
rather than its adaptive potential, we do not address this possibility further, but
rather direct the interested reader to Andrews and Thompson (2009).
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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development of affective symptomatology such as suicidal ideation
(e.g., Surrence, Miranda, Marroquin, & Chan, 2009). More recently,
rumination has been recognized as a transdiagnostic process that is
present in many anxiety and affective disorders (Ehring, Kleim, &
Ehlers, 2011; McLaughlin & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011), and appears
to have a causal impact on the development of intrusive memories
(Ball & Brewin, 2012). For this reason, it is perhaps no surprise that
there has been growing interest in the cognitive and biological
factors that predispose certain individuals towards rumination (for
reviews, see Joormann, 2010; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013).
In recent years, rumination has been linked to meta-cognitive
beliefs concerning the utility and uncontrollability of repetitive
thought (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003). Whereas the belief that
rumination is an adaptive cognitive strategy predicts the onset of
rumination, the belief that rumination is uncontrollable or related
to poor interpersonal or social outcomes has been found to mediate
the relationship between rumination and depressive symptom-
atology. Perhaps lending credibility to beliefs concerning its un-
controllability, rumination has also been associated with executive
dysfunction across a range of cognitive tasks, even after controlling
for depression (e.g., De Lissnyder, Derakshan, De Raedt, & Koster,
2011; Joormann, 2005; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky,
2008; Whitmer& Banich, 2007). For example, rumination has been
found to predict impairments in the ability to disengage attention
in an antisaccade task (De Lissnyder et al., 2011) and also in the
ability to inhibit previous task sets in a task-switching paradigm
using either emotional or non-emotional materials (De Lissnyder,
Koster, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2010; Whitmer & Banich, 2007).
Such dysfunction has been shown to precede (as opposed to follow)
the onset of rumination, suggesting a critical role in the emergence
of this behaviour (De Lissnyder et al., 2012; Whitmer & Gotlib,
2012). In fact, some theorists have argued that it is a general
impairment in the ability to disengage attention from distracting or
unwanted information that predisposes certain individuals towards
ruminating in the ﬁrst place (Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan,& De
Raedt, 2011). Accordingly, the ability to focus on relevant infor-
mation and suppress irrelevant information e either internally or
externallye is critical in avoiding repetitive thought cycles, and “…
individuals who are characterized by a difﬁculty to exercise
attentional control in response to negative thoughts are likely to
experience persistent rumination” (p. 139, Koster et al., 2011).
Despite some accounts (e.g., Joormann, 2010), these impairments
do not appear to be limited to emotional material e at least in the
absence of depression (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013).
1.1. Rumination and memory suppression
The clear linkage between rumination and inhibitory control
deﬁcits in attention tasks (for reviews, see Koster et al., 2011;
Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013) raises the possibility that such deﬁcits
extend to disordered control over thoughts and memories.
Although persistent thoughts and unwantedmemories may appear
to differ in many ways, most psychological disorders are charac-
terized by attempts to avoid both (Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, &
Burgess, 2010). Moreover, the two often occur simultaneously and
are reciprocally connected (Newby & Moulds, 2012; Pearson,
Brewin, Rhodes, & McCarron, 2008). Thus the notion that individ-
ual differences in the efﬁcacy of cognitive control could predict
ruminative tendencies has also led to work addressing the link
between rumination and memory suppression. Memory suppres-
sion refers to the ability to suppress retrieval of an unwanted
memory when faced with a reminder and is typically measured
using the think/no-think (TNT) paradigm. In this paradigm, par-
ticipants learn cue-target word pairs until the cue reliably activatesthe associated target. They then undergo a series of trials inwhich a
subset of the studied cue words is sequentially presented and
participants must either retrieve (Think trials) or suppress (No-
Think trials) the associated target word. This process is repeated
multiple times for each cue word, resulting in some target words
that are repeatedly retrieved and others that are repeatedly sup-
pressed. The typical ﬁnding is that memory for the retrieved (Think,
or Respond) items is signiﬁcantly better than memory for baseline
items that were neither retrieved nor suppressed (the positive
control effect) whereas memory for the suppressed (No-Think, or
Suppress) items is signiﬁcantly worse than memory for baseline
items that were neither retrieved nor suppressed (the negative
control effect, or suppression-induced forgetting). These effects are
robust as demonstrated in cued-recall (e.g., Anderson & Green,
2001), recognition memory (e.g., Waldhauser Lindgren, &
Johansson, 2012) and indirect memory measures (e.g., Gagnepain,
Henson, & Anderson, 2014). Suppression is also evident in neural
indices of implicit memory such as neural priming (Gagnepain
et al., 2014). Importantly, the effects of retrieval suppression arise
even when an independent probe cues retrieval instead of the
original cue with which the target itemwas studied (e.g., Anderson
& Huddleston, 2012). The cue independence of suppression-
induced forgetting excludes interference as a possible explana-
tion, establishing the role of inhibition in producing the phenom-
enon (Huddleston & Anderson, 2012).
We propose that memory suppression as measured using the
TNT paradigm reﬂects the action of the same underlying control
processes required when mitigating the intrusions associated with
a ruminative thought: just as the retrieval of a no-think target must
be suppressed when it intrudes in response to its cue word, an
unwanted thought or memory concerning a negative event must
likewise be controlled using similar processes, lest it perseverate in
awareness and re-emerge in response to reminders. Suppression in
the TNT paradigm substantially reduces the frequency of intrusive
memories with repetition, purging intrusions from awareness via
inhibitory control mechanisms that down-regulate hippocampal
activity (Benoit, Hulbert, Huddleston, & Anderson, 2014; Levy &
Anderson, 2012). If so, the TNT paradigm represents a theoreti-
cally focused means of evaluating the executive deﬁcits thought to
predispose individuals towards symptomatology such as rumina-
tion e with the prediction that ruminative tendencies should be
associated with impaired suppression and therefore reduced
suppression-induced forgetting (Levy & Anderson, 2008). Two
studies already support this hypothesis. First, Hertel and Gerstle
(2003) used the TNT paradigm with positively or negatively
valenced word pairs to measure suppression in dysphoric and
nondysphoric populations. They found that rumination was asso-
ciated with both (a) greater recall of the no-think items, and (b) a
smaller difference in recall between think and no-think items. This
ﬁnding remained even when accounting for dysphoria. Dieler,
Herrmann, and Fallgatter (2014) extended these ﬁndings. Using
pairs of neutral faces and either negative or neutral target images,
they demonstrated a correlation between ruminative brooding and
reduced suppression-induced forgetting, but only for negative
targets.
1.2. The current experiment
The negative correlation observed between rumination and
suppression-induced forgetting is consistent with the theoretical
argument that impaired control processes predispose individuals
towards ruminative tendencies. However, this relationship may not
reﬂect an inability to implement control, but rather a tendency not
to do so. For example, whereas impaired memory suppression
might predispose individuals towards rumination, we speculate
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the experimental instructions to suppress retrieval as closely as do
non-ruminative individuals. Highly ruminative individuals often
believe that repetitive thought is valuable (e.g., Papageorgiou &
Wells, 2003), raising the possibility that earlier investigations
may simply have conﬂated deﬁcits in suppression-induced
forgetting with differences in cognitive style. In a recent review,
Anderson and Huddleston (2012) argued that variation in
suppression-induced forgetting could be attributable in part to
differences in the degree towhich participants possessed either the
capacity or the willingness to suppress retrieval of the no-think
items. By this view, the capacity to suppress retrieval relates to
the efﬁcacy of inhibitory control, and so factors thought to inﬂu-
ence inhibitory control should mitigate retrieval suppression and
its behavioral consequences. However, even a substantial inhibitory
capacity accomplishes little if participants are not disposed to
suppress, and instead deliberately re-process the no-think items.
People disposed towards rumination may have a habit of revisiting
thoughts voluntarily, which would undo the effects of suppression,
a ﬁnding that could masquerade as a deﬁcit in inhibitory control
over memory.
The current investigation examines whether the relation be-
tween rumination and memory suppression remains after ac-
counting for ruminators' tendency to voluntarily re-engage to-be-
suppressed thoughts. In so doing, we seek to better evaluate
whether rumination is truly associated with diminished mnemonic
control. If rumination represents a particular response style inde-
pendent of any control deﬁcits, those exhibiting chronic rumination
may be more inclined to intentionally reﬂect on their memory for
the no-think items. If this hypothesis is correct, rumination scores
should predict participants’ tendency to violate our suppression
instructions by deliberately re-processing no-think items both
during and after the trials on which they are meant to be sup-
pressing retrieval. To the extent that measures of deliberate re-
processing represent conscious, intentional retrieval of no-think
items, we can use this measured noncompliance to ascertain
whether the predicted relationship between rumination and
memory suppression survives when variability due to voluntary re-
processing is controlled statistically.
To address this question, we used the think/no-think paradigm
(based upon Anderson& Green, 2001) with neutral word-pairs. We
selected neutral stimuli so that we can clearly establish that any
observed deﬁcit reﬂects a general difﬁculty with inhibitory control
over memory, and not a problem in disengaging from emotional
material. Thus far, the relation between rumination and memory
suppression, like the relation between rumination and directed
forgetting (Joormann & Tran, 2009), has only been observed using
emotional stimuli (Dieler et al., 2014; Hertel & Gerstle, 2003), and
was not found to be present with neutral stimuli (Dieler et al.,
2014). This ﬁnding is contrary to other studies reporting
rumination-related cognitive control deﬁcits that appear to be
unaffected by valence, at least within non-depressed populations
(see Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013).
Moreover, because we sought to quantify variation in an
inhibitory process that we believe to be common to both memory
suppression and the mitigation of repetitive thought, we needed to
ensure that participants used a uniform strategy, and ensure that
the inhibitory control process hypothesized to be deﬁcient was
likely to be engaged. We therefore used direct suppression task
instructions (Benoit & Anderson, 2012; Bergstrom, de Fockert, &
Richardson-Klavehn, 2009) instead of unguided suppression.
Direct suppression instructions request that participants solve the
No-Think task by suppressing any effort to retrieve anything at all in
response to the cue e even distracting thoughts that might other-
wise occupy awareness e and, moreover, to push the unwantedmemory out of awareness in cases in which it does intrude. Direct
suppression may be distinguished from thought substitution,
which instead involves generating substitutememories or thoughts
to distract oneself, and so actively engages the retrieval process.
Although both direct suppression and thought substitution induce
forgetting of No-Think items, the neural mechanisms underlying
them have been dissociated: Whereas direct suppression involves
the down-regulation of neocortical and/or hippocampal regions by
the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, thought substitution instead
recruits the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex to aid in selecting an
appropriate substitute (Benoit & Anderson, 2012; Gagnepain et al.,
2014).
Because the distinction between direct suppression and thought
substitution has only recently been investigated, themajority of the
current literature (including those ﬁndings summarized above) has
employed general, unguided task instructions that do not clearly
favor either strategy. As a consequence, much of the current data on
suppression-induced forgetting may reﬂect an aggregation of the
neural processes summarized above. Therefore, the second moti-
vation of the current project was to further demonstrate
suppression-induced forgetting in a large sample of participants
explicitly instructed to employ a direct suppression strategy (e.g.,
Benoit & Anderson, 2012). By demonstrating suppression-induced
forgetting under circumstances in which participants are asked to
fully suppress retrieval (as opposed to generate substitutes), we
expect our measure to be more likely to reﬂect the action of the
fronto-hippocampal modulatory mechanism believed to underlie
voluntary memory inhibition, and so provide a more theoretically
focused test of the role of memory inhibition deﬁcits in rumination.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Participants
A sample of 114 undergraduate students fromUniversity College
London participated in exchange for course credit. Of this sample,
96 (41 males, 55 females) completed the rumination measure; only
this sub-sample was included in our primary analyses. Participants
were recruited using online advertisements and all procedures and
materials were approved through the Ethics Committee of the
University College London Division of Psychology and Language
Sciences. Written informed consent was obtained.
2.2. Stimuli and apparatus
Stimuli consisted of 36 experimental word pairs and 18 ﬁller
pairs. All pairs were neutral in valence. The experimental word
pairs were counterbalanced across condition (think, no-think and
baseline). Filler word pairs served as buffers at the beginning and
end of the learning and test phases to minimize primacy and
recency effects and also as practice items during the think/no-think
phase. Performance was not analyzed for ﬁller items.
2.3. Procedure
The procedure for this experiment is depicted in Fig. 1.
2.3.1. Study phase
In the initial portion of the study phase, participants studied
each word pair for 4 s after which they practiced retrieving the
target word when presented with the cue for each pair. During this
portion of the phase, each cue appeared one at a time in the center
of the screen (preceded by a 400 ms ﬁxation) and remained until
participants produced the associate out loud. The correct target was
presented 400 ms later and remained onscreen until the
Fig. 1. Participants ﬁrst learned the word pairs in the study phase, after which they practiced retrieving the target word aloud when presented with the cue for each pair. Once
participants either completed this cycle twice or reached at least 50% performance in the test-feedback phase, they completed one ﬁnal criterion test that was identical with the
exception that no feedback was presented (as represented by the dotted line in the ﬁgure). Participants then completed the Think/No-Think (TNT) phase. For Think items (in green),
participants retrieved the associated target. For No-Think items (in red), they were asked to prevent the target from coming to mind without distracting themselves with other
thoughts. Following the TNT phase participants completed the test phase, in which they were presented with each hint word and were instructed to recall the corresponding
target aloud. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Participants were instructed to use the appearance of the target as
an opportunity to better learn the cue-target pairs. This process was
continued until a threshold of 50% accuracy was achieved or until
the phase was repeated thrice. Participants were then given one
ﬁnal criterion test without feedback to gauge whether they learned
each item.
2.3.2. Think/No-think phase
During the think/no-think phase, participants were presented
with two-thirds of the studied cue words, one at a time, in either
green or red font. For the green words, participants were asked to
covertly recall and maintain the relevant target word (Think con-
dition). For red words, participants were instead instructed to focus
on the cue while clearing their mind of all other thoughts, espe-
cially the target word (No-Think condition). During these trials they
were also instructed to never replace the target word with any
other thought or word. These instructions correspond to the direct
suppression instructions used by past researchers (e.g., Benoit &
Anderson, 2012; Bergstrom et al., 2009; Gagnepain et al., 2014).
Each cue word was presented for 3 s, after which a ﬁxation cross
appeared for 500 ms. Before the experimental think/no-think trials
began, participants completed 35 practice trials using the ﬁller
items split into two short phases. A break occurred halfway through
the practice phase during which the experimenter administered a
brief questionnaire and offered feedback on how participants were
performing the task. Overall, participants completed a total of 288
think/no-think trials representing 12 repetitions of each item. Trials
were split into six blocks with two repetitions of each item within
each block. The ﬁxed presentation order for each block was createdpseudo-randomly with the constraints that (i) there were no more
than 3 consecutive cues of the same color, and (ii) a given cue could
only be repeated once all other cues had been presented within a
block.
2.3.3. Test phase
Participants were once again tested for all word pairs in a
manner identical to the ﬁnal criterion test of the study phase. On
each trial, a single cue word was presented for 4 s followed by a
ﬁxation cross that was presented for 400 ms. Participants were
instructed to recall the relevant target word out loud. No feedback
was given and responses were recorded and scored by the
researcher.
2.3.4. Post-experimental questionnaires
Following the test phase, participants completed the 22-item
Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003). Past studies have found the ruminative re-
sponses scale to demonstrate high internal reliability (Cronbach
alphaz0.90; for a review, see Luminet, 2004); this measure is also
thought to estimate stable ruminative tendencies, as evidenced by
high test-retest reliability (r z 0.80; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, &
Larson, 1994; Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999) even across a
period greater than 1.5 years. Our sample mean for this measure
was 42.74 (SE ¼ 1.00) with scores ranging from 24 to 75 and with
ﬁrst and third quartiles of 35 and 49, respectively. Cronbach's alpha
as calculated in our sample was suitably high and similar to those
reported in past studies (a ¼ .88).
In addition, participants completed two self-report question-
naires measuring (a) the strategies employed during the Think/No-
4 Semi-partial correlations exclude common variance between one variable in a
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processed the to-be-suppressed items during no-think trials,
against our instructions. During the strategy questionnaire partic-
ipants rated how often they used strategies related to either direct
suppression (e.g., stared intently at the red word, kept mind clear) or
thought substitution (e.g., generated a related thought or idea,
generated a memory) on a scale from Never (0) to Always (4). Direct
suppression strategies (M¼ 1.92, SE¼ 0.07) were signiﬁcantlymore
common than thought substitution (M ¼ 0.68, SE ¼ 0.06),
t(92) ¼ 13.93, p < .001, d ¼ 2.90. This represents a substantial
reduction in the use of thought substitution as a strategy relative to
samples in which direct suppression instructions were not given
(e.g., typical thought substitution scores range between 2.25 and
2.75; e.g., see also, Levy & Anderson, 2008, Figure 5 for strategy
percentages in a large uninstructed sample) and suggests compli-
ance with this aspect of our task instructions.
The re-processing measure was comprised of two key self-
report items in which participants indicated how frequently
(from never [0] to very frequently [4]) they (a) reﬂected brieﬂy
about the target word during no-think trials, prior to suppressing
awareness and (b) revisited brieﬂy their thoughts about the target
word after each no-think trial was over, and the cue word was
removed from the screen.2 Responses were summed to form a
deliberate re-processing score ranging from 0 to 8. Our sample
mean for thismeasurewas 1.13 (SE¼ 0.12) with scores ranging from
0 to 5 and with ﬁrst and third quartiles of 0 and 2, respectively.
3. Results
Analyses were conducted on recall scores conditionalized on
initial learning performance (e.g., Anderson et al., 2004). Thus,
items were only included if they were recalled during the criterion
test at the end of the learning phase. Because unlearned items can
be neither suppressed nor retrieved during the Think/No-Think
phase, they should contribute only noise to the data, mitigating
any statistical effects, justifying their exclusion. Prior to analysis,
one participant was excluded as an extreme outlier for demon-
strating a suppression-induced forgetting effect exceeding 4.5
standard deviations from the mean.
3.1. Basic analyses
We ﬁrst analyzed the effect of condition (Suppress, Baseline,
Respond) using a repeated-measure ANOVA. As depicted in Fig. 2,
the main effect of condition was signiﬁcant, F(2, 188) ¼ 21.62,
MSE ¼ 127.46, p < .001, hg2 ¼ 0.110. Comparisons conducted using
Fisher's Least Signiﬁcant Difference (LSD ¼ 3.23; Williams & Abdi,
2010) revealed performance to be lower for the Suppress items
than for the Baseline items. Performance was similar for the
Baseline and Respond items. Thus, suppression-induced forgetting
(Baseline e Suppress ¼ 9.13%, SE ¼ 1.74%) was observed, whereas
little beneﬁt of repeated retrieval was found (Respond e
Baseline¼ 0.38%, SE¼ 1.31%), perhaps because overall performance
was high.32 A third item typically included in this questionnaire (During No-Think trials, I
thought about the item that went with the hint word to improve my memory for
that item) was excluded on the basis that it did not reﬂect re-processing in the
same manner as the other two. It had more to do with intentional memorization.
This decision was made prior to analysis, and inclusion of that question does not
impact the nature or signiﬁcance of any of the reported ﬁndings.
3 A similar pattern was observed in the full sample of 113 participants, F(2,
224) ¼ 21.90, MSE ¼ 116.76, p < .001, hg2 ¼ 0.095, LSD ¼ 2.83. Performance was
lower for the Suppress items (M ¼ 86.13%, SE ¼ 1.47%) than for Baseline items
(M ¼ 94.37%, SE ¼ 0.82%) or Respond items (M ¼ 94.36%, SE ¼ 1.02%).3.2. Relation between suppression, rumination and deliberate Re-
processing
We next considered the relation between the magnitude of
suppression-induced forgetting (Baseline e Suppress) and self-
reported rumination and deliberate re-processing scores.
Suppression-induced forgetting was negatively correlated with
both rumination, r ¼ 0.25, p ¼ .014, and deliberate re-processing,
r ¼ 0.22, p ¼ .034. Although the positive control effect did not
correlatewith either rumination, r¼ 0.05, p¼ .640, or deliberate re-
processing, r ¼ 0.14, p ¼ .166, these particular correlations must be
interpreted cautiously due to the apparent absence of a positive
control effect in our sample. As hypothesized based on prior liter-
ature, rumination scores did indeed predict deliberate re-
processing during No-Think trials, r ¼ 0.25, p ¼ .014. This rumina-
tion/deliberate re-processing correlation complicates interpreta-
tion of the individual suppression-induced forgetting/rumination
and suppression-induced forgetting/re-processing correlations due
to shared variance between these predictors. To determine the
origin of the observed effects, semi-partial correlations were
calculated exploring the relation between suppression-induced
forgetting and each variable, controlling for the remaining vari-
able (Algina & Keselman, 2010): Put differently, the correlation
between suppression-induced forgetting and rumination was
calculated while controlling statistically for deliberate re-
processing, and then the correlation between suppression-
induced forgetting and deliberate re-processing was calculated
while controlling statistically for rumination. The resulting metric
measured the variance in suppression-induced forgetting explain-
able by rumination or deliberate re-processing, independent of
each other. Whereas the semi-partial correlations revealed a sig-
niﬁcant relation between suppression-induced forgetting and
rumination, r ¼ 0.20, p ¼ .045, the relation between forgetting
and deliberate re-processing was in the predicted direction but was
no longer signiﬁcant, r ¼ 0.16, p ¼ .121.4 This outcome reinforces
the relation between rumination and impaired suppression-
induced forgetting, while suggesting that the relation between
deliberate re-processing and impaired forgetting is also driven in
part by ruminative tendencies.
To further illustrate the relationship between rumination/
deliberate re-processing and memory suppression, supplementary
quartile split analyses were also conducted for the rumination and
re-processing comparisons (see right panel of Fig. 2). To maximize
statistical power, each variable was dichotomized to compare only
the lower and upper quartiles (e.g., Gelman & Park, 2009). As
evident in Fig. 2, the low rumination group demonstrated signiﬁ-
cantly more suppression-induced forgetting (M ¼ 0.16, SE ¼ 0.03)
than did the high rumination group (M ¼ 0.03, SE ¼ 0.03;
t(46) ¼ 3.05, p ¼ .004); once again, practically no difference was
observed between these groups for the magnitude of the positive
control effect (Low:M ¼ 0.01, SE ¼ 0.01; High:M ¼ 0.03, SE ¼ 0.02;correlation (e.g., rumination) and some other controlled variable (e.g., deliberate
reprocessing) while preserving the variance of the remaining variable in the cor-
relation (the suppression-induced forgetting effect). Another approach is to exclude
common variance between each variable in the correlation and the controlled
variable, resulting in a partial correlation (Delaney, 2010). Partial correlations are
always larger than semi-partial correlations but in this case produce the same
pattern: A signiﬁcant relation between suppression-induced forgetting and rumi-
nation, r ¼ 0.21, p ¼ .040, the relation between forgetting and deliberate re-
processing was in the predicted direction but was no longer signiﬁcant,
r ¼ 0.16, p ¼ .109. Non-parametric alternatives were also calculated for all basic,
partial and semi-partial correlation analyses (i.e., Kendall's Tau and non-parametric
bootstrapped regression models) and the same effects emerged. We have reported
Pearson correlations instead for ease of interpretation.
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Fig. 2. The percent recalled target items (conditionalized on initial learning performance) as a function of condition (No-Think, Baseline, Think) in the total sample and then
separated into low/high groups according to rumination or deliberate re-processing scores. To maximize statistical power, rumination and deliberate re-processing were
dichotomized to compare only the lower and upper quartiles (e.g., Gelman & Park, 2009): The “low” and “high” groups were deﬁned as those individuals scoring in the bottom 25%
and the top 25% of the relevant metric, respectively, with the middle 50% of the sample excluded. Error-bars for the left panel represent within-subject standard error (e.g., Franz &
Loftus, 2012). All other error bars represent between-subject standard error with the pairwise comparisons reported in-text.
J.M. Fawcett et al. / J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 47 (2015) 1e86t(46) ¼ 0.43, p ¼ .666). Indeed, the differences in the amount of
suppression-induced forgetting appeared to be driven exclusively
by numerical differences in the recall of suppress items. The
deliberate re-processing analysis revealed a similar pattern. The
low re-processing group (M ¼ 0.15 SE ¼ 0.03) demonstrated
signiﬁcantly more suppression-induced forgetting than did the
high re-processing group (M ¼ 0.06, SE ¼ 0.03; t(46) ¼ 2.09,
p ¼ .042) but no difference in the facilitation effect (Low:
M ¼ 0.03, SE ¼ 0.03; High: M ¼ 0.01, SE ¼ 0.02; t(46) ¼ 0.95,
p ¼ .349). However, unlike the rumination analysis, the difference
in suppression-induced forgetting for the deliberate re-processing
analysis arose from the combination of numerically greater recall
of suppress items and numerically lesser recall of baseline items in
the high as compared to low re-processing groups.
4. Discussion
The current study demonstrates a clear relationship between
self-reported rumination and memory suppression ability. Impor-
tantly, it is the ﬁrst to measure this relationship while controlling
statistically for differences in the tendency to voluntarily re-process
the to-be-suppressed memories. Because deliberate re-processing
is correlated with both rumination and memory suppression,
failure to account for this behavior when considering rumination-
related differences in memory suppression risks conﬂating inhibi-
tory deﬁcits with more general differences in processing style.
Our ﬁndings demonstrate that even controlling for deliberate
re-processing, rumination signiﬁcantly predicts impaired
suppression-induced forgetting. Further, we demonstrate that this
relation is wholly attributable to greater memory for the suppress
items; rumination does not predict memory for either the baseline
or respond items. These ﬁndings complement recent evidence that
self-reports of thought control ability in daily life predict
suppression-induced forgetting of aversive scenes (Kuepper,
Benoit, Dalgleish, & Anderson, 2014), and converge on the view
that people are sensitive to their own capacity to regulate un-
wanted thoughts.
In the current procedure, we measured the tendency to delib-
erately re-process unwanted information by asking participants to
rate the extent to which they intentionally thought about to-be-
suppressed items, irrespective of our instructions not to. By con-
trolling for this measured tendency for deliberate re-processing,
the remaining correlation between rumination and suppression
better isolates inhibitory impairments. Another interpretation,however, might be that deliberate re-processing instead simply
captures whether participants become aware of unintentional in-
trusions. Ruminative individuals often report the belief that their
repetitive thoughts are difﬁcult to control (e.g., Papageorgiou &
Wells, 2003). These meta-cognitive beliefs e which predict the
development of depression and continuing repetitive thoughts
(Papageorgiou &Wells, 2004) e might represent insight into their
own deﬁcits. By this interpretation, our measure of deliberate re-
processing may not be distinct from an inhibitory deﬁcit.
We do not favor this interpretation, however, because it as-
sumes that participants interpret unintentional intrusions as
intentional retrieval. We consider this unlikely. We purposely
framed the questions on our measure to emphasize a deliberate,
willful act, and included (a) an admonishment in the instructions
(i.e., “Each of the following three statements is intended tomeasure
whether you ever INTENTIONALLY made an effort to think about
the responses for the red hint items”), and (b) a brief interaction
with the participant tomake sure that they were clear that wewere
not asking about accidental remindings, but purposeful reﬂection.
Instead, we speculate that the greater incidence of deliberate re-
processing in ruminative individuals reﬂects their habitual ten-
dency to revisit thoughts, because they believe this is beneﬁcial.
Indeed, participants may reﬂect on the suppress items as a means
of evaluating how effectively they were suppressed. This concep-
tualization is analogous to the ﬁnding that rumination in depres-
sion is related to beliefs concerning the beneﬁts of repetitive
thought (e.g., Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003). However, even if our
measure of deliberate re-processing reﬂects some contribution of
misinterpreted involuntary remindings, this would only strengthen
the central theoretical conclusion that ruminators suffer from an
inhibitory deﬁcit, given that the relationship remained after ac-
counting for this variable.
It is worth noting that current ﬁndings did not replicate the null
result observed by Dieler et al. (2014) concerning the correlation
between rumination and the suppression of emotionally neutral
material. One possibility pertains to the fact that whereas Dieler
et al. (2014) screened their participants for psychiatric disorders
including depression, the current experiment did not. Because the
consequences of rumination can at times vary between depressed
and non-depressed populations (e.g., for discussion, seeWhitmer&
Gotlib, 2013), our present ﬁndings must be viewed with some de-
gree of caution. However, even beyond this possibility, there exist
several methodological differences that could readily account for
the discrepancy between our studies. First, Dieler et al. (2014)
J.M. Fawcett et al. / J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 47 (2015) 1e8 7employed an unusually long inter-trial interval during their think/
no-think phase (a delay of ~8.5 s between each 4 s trial, instead of
500 ms). An extended delay following no-think trials provides
greater opportunity for intrusions (or deliberate re-processing) to
occur, as is often reported by participants during these tasks. This
may also explain why they failed to observe suppression-induced
forgetting without including rumination in their model. Second,
whereas this earlier study employed general Think/No-Think task
instructions, we used direct suppression instructions that should
provide a better measure of top-down inhibitory modulation over
mnemonic processes (Benoit & Anderson, 2012; Gagnepain et al.,
2014). The present ﬁndings therefore strongly reinforce the exis-
tence of a general memory control deﬁcit in ruminative persons
(e.g., Hertel & Gerstle, 2003), rather than a focused difﬁculty with
controlling emotionally negative material, though it remains to be
seen whether ruminators have even greater difﬁculty with inhib-
iting emotionally negative memories.
4.1. Limitations
One limitation of our experiment derives from the fact that the
current sample was taken from an undergraduate population.
Therefore, it is reasonable to wonder whether these conclusions
would also apply to a clinical sample. However, since we did not
screen out symptomatic participants, it would be incorrect to as-
sume that our undergraduate sample is healthy. As noted by
Ibrahim, Kelly, Adams, and Glazebrook (2013) in a meta-analysis of
24 studies of depression prevalence in university students, 30.6% of
university undergraduates suffer from depression, a rate markedly
higher than estimated in the general population. Consistent with
this, our mean full-scale RRS score of 42.73 was 10 points higher
than that reported for a healthy community sample deﬁned as
excluding any person meeting diagnostic criteria for any current or
past Axis I disorder (e.g., RRS ¼ 32.34: Joormann, Levens, & Gotlib,
2011). Thus, a similar study using a clinical sample would be useful
as a future direction and could prove crucial in determining
whether our ﬁndings apply equally to both healthy adults as well as
those suffering from depression.
Another limitation derives from the fact that we used a retro-
spective as opposed to online measure of deliberate re-processing.
Retrospectivemeasures depend on intact memory for the processes
at work during the Think/No-Think phase. The only alternative to
doing this retrospectively, however, was to ask participants, on a
trial-by-trial basis, whether they engaged in deliberate reprocess-
ing. Although this would reduce variance due to retrospective
memory failures, it would also undermine the suppression task
itself, by prompting participants to engage in these proscribed
behaviors. As such, we judged the retrospective approach to be the
least disruptive way of assessing deliberate reprocessing. Never-
theless, it would be useful to see whether measuring deliberate
reprocessing onlinewouldmore ﬁrmly establish a relation between
this behavior and suppression-induced forgetting, independent of
inhibition deﬁcits.
5. Conclusions
The present ﬁndings provide some of the strongest evidence to
date that rumination is associated with diminished inhibitory
control over memory and that this impairment could underlie the
core deﬁcit. Our ﬁndings are particularly diagnostic because they
are the ﬁrst to control for differences in cognitive style between
ruminators and non-ruminators, to demonstrate this relation in the
context of non-emotional stimuli and to use direct suppression
instructions that recent neuroimaging evidence suggests better
isolate top-down inhibitory modulation of mnemonic processing(e.g., Benoit & Anderson, 2012). We believe that our ﬁndings sup-
port a memory control deﬁcit associated with rumination that is
dissociable from a general cognitive style that might likewise
encourage repetitive thought.
An important implication is that clinical interventions applied to
ruminative populations should address both the maladaptive be-
liefs concerning repetitive thought and also the apparent inhibitory
deﬁcits that might complicate the suppression of those thoughts
once rumination has begun. For example, a recent intervention
aimed speciﬁcally at rumination in treatment-resistant depression
included elements designed to improve attentional control as well
as modifying meta-cognitive beliefs (Wells et al., 2012). Other
promising approaches that have brought about signiﬁcant re-
ductions in depressive rumination have sought to modify the
intrusion of unwanted memories by having depressed patients
vividly imagine positive competitor memories, and if necessary re-
scripting negative memories (Brewin et al., 2009; Ekkers et al.,
2011). At present it is not known if these interventions operate by
enhancing general inhibitory control. Designing more speciﬁc in-
terventions targeted at inhibitory processes, as well as identifying
possible genetic contributions to inhibitory control, holds promise
for maximizing the effectiveness of therapies for rumination.
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